Is globalization reducing the ability of central banks to control inflation? by Gerba, Eddie & Macchiarelli, Corrado
  
Eddie Gerba and Corrado Macchiarelli 
Is globalization reducing the ability of 
central banks to control inflation? 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Gerba, Eddie and Macchiarelli, Corrado (2015) Is globalization reducing the ability of central 
banks to control inflation? IP/A/ECON/2015-07, PE 563.476. European Parliament, Policy 
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
Originally available from European Parliament 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68535/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: December 2016 
 
© 2015 European Parliament 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY
Is globalization reducing the ability
of central banks to control inflation?
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS
Abstract
Since the beginning of the crisis, inflation rates have shown a clear
downward trend in many advanced countries and have fallen well below
the targets of their respective monetary authorities. Despite strong
monetary action, inflation expectations are slow to pick up. In some
countries, the recovery is quite strong and unemployment rates have
decreased, yet price pressures and wage development continue to remain
subdued. Do central banks seem to have (partially) lost their ability to
control inflation rates? Against the backdrop of fluctuations in global
commodity prices and growth, together with the ongoing structural
changes related to globalization wielding pressure on prices and wages,
this paper focuses on the implications of globalization for domestic inflation
and its expectations and the possible consequences for national monetary
policies.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the beginning of the crisis, inflation rates have shown a clear downward trend
and have fallen well below the targets of their respective monetary authorities.
Despite strong monetary action, inflation expectations are slow to pick up. In some
countries, the recovery is quite strong and unemployment rates have decreased, yet
price pressures and wage development continue to remain subdued.
Much of the debate about globalization has revolved around the flattening of the
short-term Phillips curve over time. However, a number of studies have challenged
the idea that the evidence of a flattening of the curve reflect a mounting influence of
foreign and global measures of economic and financial slack in domestic price
changes, highlighting instead how the observed inflation “torpor” could rather be the
result of different or simultaneous factors, such as better expectations’ management,
“good luck” (fewer adverse shocks before 2007), or structural reforms in several
countries.
Regarding commodity prices, the observed surge in the real price of oil before the
crisis was driven almost entirely by a sequence of unanticipated increases in the
international demand for commodities, in particular from emerging Asia. Particularly,
the resulting (net) oil price increases over the period 2003 – 08 reflected indeed a
persistent shift in the oil’s shortage. This shift left little scope for monetary policy
authorities to mitigate the impact of the shock. Certainly, commodity prices have
come off their peak recently, and this decline is projected to persist, given recent
growth dynamics in China and the expected further slowdown in emerging economies.
However, previous evidence suggests that this may not affect core inflation directly.
Some preliminary evidence from the US says nevertheless that these dynamics in
commodity prices may feed through expected inflation under the assumption that
inflation expectations have not been fully anchored. Even there, central banks should
not worry too much about commodity shocks in global demand, beyond making sure
that inflation expectations remain anchored.
Regarding labour markets, there is sufficient evidence for wage moderation and
decreased union bargaining power over the past two decades. But rather than a result
of integration of labour markets themselves, it seems to be a consequence from
capital and product market integrations, and international competitiveness pressures
(or shocks) such as import penetration rates, mark-ups or capital flows.
On the finance side, we note that while the crisis highlighted how, in a globalized
world, monetary policy interventions had to go beyond the domestic facility wielded in
the past, this did not represented a change in the monetary policy stance. This crisis
rather highlighted the need for a global coordinated in terms of regulation,
supervision and control.
Our conclusion is that domestic monetary policy can still control domestic interest
rates and so stabilise inflation (and output). No matter the pace of globalisation and
how great its eventual extent may be, it should remain possible for a disciplined
central bank towards a clear inflation target to achieve that goal without the
impediment of having to coordinate excessively with other central banks. The only
way in which globalization might matter for monetary policy is by increasing mutual
sensitivity of the monetary transmission channel to changes in the exchange rate.
This, however, does not mean that the degree of openness of an economy lacks
significance for the conduct of monetary policy. Other important issues should be
considered, such as the correct structural specification of models on which policy is
built, the practical issues of defining domestic inflation, or the mutual financial
interconnectedness and, certainly, the need for continued coordinated financial policy
measures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the crisis, inflation rates have shown a clear downward trend in
many advanced countries and have fallen well below the targets of their respective
monetary authorities. Despite strong monetary action, inflation expectations are slow to
pick up. In some countries, the recovery is quite strong and unemployment rates have
decreased, yet price pressures and wage development continue to remain subdued. Do
central banks seem to have (partially) lost their ability to control inflation rates? The
challenges to monetary policy in an increasingly interconnected world are a topic having
long high-ranked on policy makers’ agenda. Yet, the evidence that globalization may alter
monetary policy transmission is not always conclusive. To the same degree, separating the
effect of globalization on domestic inflation, though imported goods, from that of other
factors – anchoring of expectations, economic slack, etc. – may prove difficult. Against the
backdrop of fluctuations in world commodity prices and growth, together with the ongoing
structural changes related to globalization wielding pressure on prices and wages, this
paper review focuses on the implications of globalization for domestic inflation and its
expectations and the possible consequences for national monetary policies.
2. THE “REAL-SIDE” IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION
Theoretically economists have long recognized the importance of macroeconomic
interdependence. The Mundell-Fleming models of open economies developed in the 1960s
and the 1970s, as well as the modern two-country New Keynesian models that came later,
amply described the effects that shocks to one economy may have on a representative
foreign economy.1 It had generally been understood, however, that the role of globalization
is rather an empirical issue (for a review see Chudik, 2014).
Figure 1 – Real GDP Growth
Volatility
Source: Martinez-García (2014).
Figure 2 – Inflation Volatility
Globalization is typically analysed through the lenses of interconnectedness. The latter has
substantially increased starting from the 1970s, as evidenced by a decline in the overall
macroeconomic volatility around the mid-1980s; a period known as the “Great Moderation”
in the US. Looking at the conditional standard deviation for the US and the G-8 (US, UK,
1 Two country models are suitable to better describe the behaviour of a small open economy, rather than a larger
and more closed economy such as the euro area, Japan or the US In addition, two country models have been
recognized to be insufficient to study how real and financial shocks transmit across nations in a globalized world.
Hence, multicounty-DGSE models have been developed, even if at the cost of lower transparency (see Chudik,
2014).
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Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain and Italy) one could see that real GDP growth
volatility has been mostly decreasing up until the end of the 90s, to later hit a peak in 2009
with the global financial crisis (Figure 1). Interestingly, the data also show a prevalent
decline in inflation volatility between the mid-70s and the mid-90s, tailed by a similar rise
afterwards. European countries in the catching up years – i.e. prior to the euro adoption –
have been mostly affected by such a rise in inflation volatility. The latter remained fairly
low in the US over the same period (Figure 2).
The mismatch between output and inflation volatility starting from the mid-1990s is a
phenomenon known as flattening of the short term Phillips curve. Indeed much of the
debate about globalization has revolved around the flattening of this short-term
relationship over time. Findings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, among others, support the idea of a decline in the sensitivity of inflation to
the domestic output gap (i.e. output in deviation from its potential) over time in many
industrialized countries, including the US and the euro area (on the latter see also Anderton
et al., 2009). As noted by Martinez-García (2014), Ball (2006), Ighir et al. (2007), a
number of studies have nevertheless challenged the idea that the evidence of a flattening
of the Phillips curve over time reflect a mounting influence of foreign and global measures
of economic and financial slack in domestic price changes (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007),
highlighting instead how the observed inflation “torpor” could rather be the result of
different or simultaneous factors, such as better expectations’ management (Bernanke,
2010), “good luck” (fewer adverse shocks before 2007), or structural reforms in several
countries (Anderton et al. 2009).
Rather than looking at a steepening of the Phillips curve itself, one could also note that,
theoretically, there are in fact a number of explanations for which structural changes in the
slope of the Phillips curve through globalization, as well as the direct contribution of import
prices to measures of domestic inflation, may not necessarily be linear. These include the
degree and extent of openness with respect to other countries (see also Martínez-García
and Wynne (2010); lower mark-ups and marginal costs, owing to competition driving
inflation down and prices to be more flexible through imported goods’ prices; measures of
domestic economic slack (see e.g., Ball, 2006; Rogoff, 2006).
3. THE “FINANCE-SIDE” IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION
While it goes beyond the scope of this analysis, one should recognize that there is also a
finance-side of the globalization.
Deregulation of the financial services industry, starting from the 1980’s, and the
internationalization of financial market activity from 1990’s have completely re-shaped the
industry both in its shape and form. Banks, traditionally the core financial intermediaries of
a country have grown into multinational universal banks, many of them operating in more
than 100 countries. In addition, the traditional retail banking divisions have fused with
more modern investment and derivative-trading activities. The result is a more integrated
risk-management approach and a higher ability to perform regulatory arbitrage by banks.
The emergence of market-based financing institutions, MBFI (or shadow banks, as they are
often called) has completely changed the fund-raising model of banks. Rather than relying
on traditional deposits, banks have increasingly turned to the MBFIs for liquidity. Moreover,
these institutions have also become core funders of derivative and other non-traditional
investment products, often via special-purpose vehicles or conduits. The total effect of this
‘revolution’ is that market-based financial institutions have not only become the centralised
liquidity supplier for banks in one country, but for much of the international financial
market over the 2000’s.
The equity markets have undergone a similar internationalization, both on the supply and
the demand end. For investors, improved technology, the IT-revolution in the investment
industry, and the removal of entrance barriers in stock markets has given unprecedented
access to international investments, both in terms of reach and speed. For firms requiring
financing, the internationalisation of the supply-chain and the business models coupled with
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the removal of barriers to quote on other stock markets has meant that the share of
financing coming from countries other than that of the headquarters has drastically
increased. The impact has been an increased geographical portfolio diversification as well
as a higher diversity in capital structure of firms.
There has also been a sharp re-balance in the FX-market and the currency reserves. First,
the dollar reserves (or dollar-denominated claims) in China and Japan are now as high (or
even higher) than the Federal Reserve’s. The implication is that Fed’s control over its
currency’s value is attenuated. Second, the rising importance of the Euro as an
international currency, both in terms of its trade on the FX-market and as a reserve
currency in other central banks, has increased its exposure to international shocks. Lastly,
the volume of the FX market has markedly increased since the turn of the millennium. The
market is de-centralised and over-the-counter (OTC) which has allowed it to globalize more
than any other segment of the financial market.
For national central banks, the implications are several. On one hand, the financial
supervisors have a tougher task to oversee bank activities outside their borders. Financial
regulators have a more complex task to impose binding rules on the institutions. And for
monetary policy, the trade-off between inflation and output is flattened and the ability to
control (national) inflation is weakened.2
4. GLOBALIZATION AND MONETARY POLICY
There are a numbers of ways in which globalization constrain or simply interact with the
ability of monetary authorities to achieve price stability. First, as countries become more
integrated into the globalized world, their economic and financial conditions are likely to
become more affected by external shocks. Secondly, globalization may alter the
transmission channels of monetary policy itself. Working though the real side, and with
trade becoming more important, monetary policy may have incentives to act through
exchange rates and net exports and less through domestic aggregate demand (Kamin
2010). On the finance side, with long-term bond yields being increasingly priced in
international markets, their responsiveness to short-term policy rates in control of
monetary authorities may decline. This can be particularly the case in an environment of
abundance of liquidity, and long term-interest rate convergence, as it was the case just
before 2007 (OECD, 2013).
4.1. Real side: Oil price, global demand and expectations
OECD Staff estimates suggest that the integration of non-OECD economies over the period
1996-2005 into world trade has reduced annual domestic inflation overall. In particular,
prior to the crisis, the advent of China and other Asian economies has reduced annual
domestic inflation by 0.2 on average in the US and the euro area up until 2005 (Pain et al.,
2006).
Over the last couple of years, globalization has also worked though world demand, mainly
consumption. The increase in global consumption of food and other commodities, especially
from China and other Asian economies, has resulted into higher food and energy prices
globally, including oil prices. This effect has partially offset the lower prices globalization
induced through imported goods and services (Stark, 2008). There is not much a central
bank can do about changes in the relative prices of food and energy (the so called “core”
inflation component) but to accommodate such first round effects on headline inflation.
There is a consensus, however, that a central bank aiming at maintaining price stability
should carefully monitor price and wage development to avoid second round effects, as well
as ensure that inflation expectations remain well anchored (Stark, 2008).
2 We just wish to outline some of the developments and processes in the financial industry since the
1990’s. The topic is complex and large, requiring a separate analysis on the effects of financial
industry internationalization on monetary policy. However, this is outside the scope of the current
paper.
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Figure 3 – Net Oil Price Increase Index
Note: The net oil price increase is computed as in Hamilton (1996), i.e. considering the price of oil
price in the current quarter, relative to the maximum value for the level achieved during the previous
four quarters. Last observation 2010Q2.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Talking about globalization and monetary policy, Woodford (2010), among others, argued
that theoretically globalization does not necessarily imply a weakening of monetary policy
in affecting the real side of the economy, i.e. output and inflation. Instead, the effect of
globalization is to be expected on the trade-offs of monetary policy over time and the
economic (and financial) environment in which monetary policy has to operate (Bernanke,
2007). In a changing environment, the relevant trade-offs must be recognized, particularly
from a policy making point of view, when designing monetary policy effectively (see also
Martinez-García, 2014). The question is however to which extent the observed changes are
due to globalization?
One of the aforementioned trade-offs consists in the identification of inflation’s long run
trend dynamics, as opposed to the short run dynamics. As Stark (2008) puts it, central
banks have to cope with the idea that the impact of surges in oil and commodity prices on
output and inflation depends crucially on the reaction of economic agents (i.e.
expectations), particularly participants in the product and labour market.
Importantly, expectations will have to do not only with the reaction of agents in response
to the original shock (first-hand effect), but also with the economic agents’ response to the
monetary policy stance after the shock (second-hand effect). Second round effects will be
stronger the larger the shock affecting headline inflation (hence, prompting a more decisive
monetary policy reaction). The nonappearance of second-round effects following food and
commodity shocks will depend indeed on inflation expectations remaining firmly
anchored.
Worldwide, the observed oil prices fell in the 1990s (Figure 3) partly due to increases in
non-OPEC oil production (Anderton et al. 2009). The observed surge in the real price of oil
more recently – just before the crisis – was instead driven almost entirely by a sequence of
unanticipated increases in the international demand for commodities. In particular, the
latest oil price boom of 2008 was driven by unexpected growth in emerging Asia, as
evidenced by the data on professional real GDP forecast errors shown in Table 1. What
happened was not that OECD demand for oil and other commodities increased by much,
but rather that additional unanticipated demand arose from Asia, given continued high
demand from OECD countries (Kilian, 2009). Such global aggregate demand forces more
than offset the increases in the production of crude oil over the same period, mainly
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stemming from supply in newly opened areas (like the Caspian Sea).3 The resulting (net) oil
price increases in Figure 3 over the period 2003 – 08 reflect indeed a persistent shift in the
oil’s shortage. Once again this was mainly driven by unanticipated positive global aggregate
demand shocks after 2003, as Figure 4 further illustrates.
Table 1 – Average Forecast Surprises
(Percentage points)
Note: Average forecast surprises computed based on successive annual forecasts of real GDP growth
reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit
Source: Killian and Hicks (2009).
This shift in the real scarcity of resources left little scope for monetary policy authorities to
mitigate the impact of the shock. There is, moreover, no evidence that speculation or
supply side shocks in oil markets significantly affected monetary policy indeed over the
same period (for the US, see Kilian, 2009).
Figure 4 - Explanatory Power of Oil Supply and Oil Demand  Shocks for the
Real Oil Price
Note: The vertical line marks mid 2008 when global real economic activity peaked.
Source: Killian (2009a).
3 This new production only partially offset declining rates of production in other geologically mature non-OPEC oil
regions, such as the North Sea or the US.
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Figure 5 – Channels through which inflation expectations could affect the
persistence of inflation
Source: Maule and Pugh (2013).
Simulation results proposed in Anderton et al. (2009) for the euro and US show that, prior
to the crisis, oil price impacts on inflation seemed to be weaker than in the past and it did
not tend to feed into core inflation. This seemed to be indeed partly the result of anti-
inflationary monetary policy, which has kept inflation expectations well anchored (the so-
called “anchored expectations” hypothesis of Bernanke, 2010). In the same vein, Blanchard
and Galí (2007) found that oil price shocks have progressively had smaller effects
compared to the past on prices and wages also owing to an increase in the credibility of
monetary policy, as well as a decrease in the share of oil in consumption and production.
Cecchetti and Moessner (2008) also found that in recent years core inflation has not tended
to follow headline inflation in response to food and commodity price shocks, implying that
commodity prices do not now generally lead to second-round effects on inflation. Furlong
and Ingenito (1996) showed as well how commodity prices generally fail to predict core
inflation. Commodity prices have come off their peak, and this decline is projected to
persist, given recent growth dynamics in China and the expected further slowdown in
emerging economies. In the light of the evidence mentioned above, it seems highly unlikely
based on the aforementioned results that the deflationary trend observed more recently is
the result of first-hand effects (commodity prices to core inflation) from the recent sharp
fall in oil prices.
Having excluded this hypothesis leave us with the other hypothesis that behind the
deflation pattern observed in many countries is the loss of anchoring of expectations (i.e.
central bank credibility); a scenario certainly difficult to assert at this stage. Consistent with
this hypothesis, is the evidence from the US provided by Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2015). The latter shed light on the possibility that changes in household inflation
expectations between 2009 and 2011 could be explained by changes in oil prices in the US.
In other words, the latter authors highlight how commodity prices seem to have fed
through inflation expectations, given that the latter were not fully anchored. In particular,
given that inflation expectations clearly play an important role in determining the
persistence of inflation itself (Figure 4), the latter findings – under the assumption that
household expectations have not been fully anchored – could make us reconsider the
relationship between commodity (oil) price and inflation. The general consensus is that
there is nothing a central bank could or should do in response to shocks in commodities
and global demand, beyond making sure that inflation expectations remained anchored. If
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the anchoring of inflation expectations has been lost (Kilian, 2009; Stark, 2008), and
commodity prices fed through the expectation channel, hence marking a shift with respect
to the previous decade, it is difficult to say now. A preliminary look at the US evidence
supports this idea, even if its assessment would certainly require a more thorough
quantitative analysis. Should this be the case, central banks should avoid mixing signals,
and facilitate instead communication with markets’ participants, to reduce second-round
effects.
4.2. Real side: Wages and the globalization of markets
Most empirical studies have shown that there has been a significant wage moderation going
on since 1990’s. While most of them show that one of the key underlying causes is the
increased integration of product, capital (and to some extent) labour markets, or
globalisation, there is little agreement on the exact mechanism at work. In a study of five
EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the UK), Dumot et al (2006) find a
negative effect of internationalization on union bargaining power, even in highly powerful
labour union countries such as Germany and France. Their results are most significant for
the latter half of the 1990’s and 2000’s. Coinciding with the period of largest wage
moderation found in OECD countries during the same period (OECD, 2003), they conclude
that this moderation has been caused by a decreased power of labour unions, rather than
sticky wages or a decrease in labour demand, as proposed in Bhagawati and Deheija
(1994).4
A firm-level study of Belgian enterprises in Abraham et al (2009) depicts a more detailed
landscape. They find that in sectors with high mark-ups, the globalisation (defined as a
simultaneous integration of product and labour markets) has resulted in an increase of the
unions bargaining power. In sectors where competition from low-wage countries increased,
on the other hand, the integration of markets has resulted in a significant decrease of the
bargaining power. Stated slightly differently, in sectors with high import penetration rates,
the mark-ups are lower, and so are the union bargaining power, resulting in an overall
wage moderation (and positive employment effects).
In a theoretical (neoclassical trade model) study, Eckel (2003), on the other hand, finds
that the key factor of whether wages moderate and unemployment rises as a result of
globalisation is the direction of capital flows.  In capital importing countries, the skills
premium (and therefore wages) increase as a result of globalisation, meanwhile
unemployment increases in capital exporting countries.
Most differentiated from the previous results is, however, the theoretical study by
Felbermayr et al (2011), who argue that trade liberalisation only leads to a decrease in
unemployment and an increase in real wages. The result holds as long as globalisation
implies an increase in productivity defined as a decrease in variable trade costs or entrance
of new countries into the trade-block permitting higher competition. Yet, as the authors
admit, the proposition is limited only to multilateral trade liberalization amongst symmetric
countries. Much of the progress in trade and market integration has been amongst
asymmetric countries in bilateral deals. To conclude, there is sufficient evidence for wage
moderation and decreased union bargaining power over the past two decades. But rather
than a result of integration of labour markets themselves, it seems a consequence from
capital and product market integrations, and international competitiveness pressures (or
shocks) such as import penetration rates, mark-ups or capital flows.
4 Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Borjas and Ramey (1995) found similar evidence of falling rents in the US and
Canada as a result of globalization. However, their studies do not include the distribution of rents between workers
and employers, and therefore the bargaining power of unions cannot be determined (Harrison, 2002).
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4.3. Finance side: Banking globalization
An important channel of monetary policy effectiveness passes through bank lending. This
has clear consequences for influencing the real side of the economy as well (i.e. output and
inflation) as well as expectations. In a previous paper (Gerba and Macchiarelli, 2015) we
noted that how banks concentration (a feature highly present in Europe, as noted by
Panetta, 2014) makes banks’ lending decisions less dependent on the monetary policy
stance (see, e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Banks with high liquidity and diversified
portfolios will be able indeed to adjust their credit flow more gradually, based on the
internal finance, so to changes in the monetary policy stance (see, e.g., Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010).  A high level of concentration, with credit markets
dominated by a limited number of large and liquid actors, would make it harder for
monetary policy to affect the banking sector.
This is the case for global banks as well. In a seminal paper, Keyshap and Stein (2000), for
instance, looked at the top 5% of banks in the asset distribution, to investigate the
relationship between banks’ size and their global network. They conclude that large global
banks are indeed insulated from monetary policy shocks, as opposed to groups of large
banks with domestic-only operations. Banks with significant operations in foreign countries
will be able to smooth monetary impulses via an internal reallocation of funds between
their head office and their foreign offices. This has certainly implication for monetary policy
spillovers across countries. Indeed, global banks, by adjusting to monetary policy shocks
via internal reallocations, will affect their foreign lending as well, hence increasing the
likelihood of cross-border propagation of domestic liquidity shocks (Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2009). This may reduce the central bank’s ability to control domestic inflation, even if there
is no conclusive evidence on this. Looking at the recent experience during the crisis, a
coordinated approach in-between central banks globally has been adopted, mainly to tackle
the systemic risk associated with the cross-border externalities of banks operating globally.
Figure 6 – Spread of LIBOR over OIS (3-Month) Interest Rates
(Basis points)
Source: Kamin and Pounder (2009).
One of the most important challenges posed by the crisis was in fact the shortage of
funding in foreign currencies experienced by several financial institutions operating globally.
All such shortages were a direct result of the globalization of banking and asset
Is globalization reducing the ability of central banks to control inflation?
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management (Kamin, 2009) and could not be addressed through standard monetary policy
tools, but required “a more internationally coordinated approach among central banks to
the lender-of-last-resort function” (Bernanke, 2008). The central banks’ measures adopted
by the Fed, the ECB, the BoJ and the BoE, mainly exploited the flexibility of the existing
monetary policy framework, with the aim of supporting banks which would have otherwise
faced a massive shortage in foreign funding; hence, not a change in the nationals’
monetary policy stances. The effectiveness of these measured is evidenced by sharp
decline in dollar Libor-OIS spreads, with credit spreads in interbank markets around
generally returning to their pre-crisis levels after 2010 (Figure 6). While the effect on
expectation is difficult to measure, these measures certainly helped restore confidence in
the interbank and money market, avoiding a liquidity shortage at this early stage of the
crisis.
Again, while the crisis highlighted how, in a globalized world, monetary policy interventions
had to go beyond the domestic facility wielded in the past, this did not represented a
change in the monetary policy stance. This crisis rather highlighted the need for a global
coordinated framework in terms of regulation, supervision and control. The Financial
Stability Board, bringing together the financial authorities of 23 countries, as well as the
new Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, including – as of 2009 – representatives
from 27 countries, are indeed examples of such a coordinated approach, beyond price
stability (see also OECD, 2013).
4.4. Globalisation and monetary discipline
It has commonly been claimed in the literature that globalisation will inevitably lead to
higher monetary discipline, since inflation expectations are lowered. The reason is the
positive feedback loop between inflation expectations and interest rate movements. This
works via multiple channels. First, economic agents understand that, as a result of
globalisation, monetary authorities credibly commit to the primary objective of price-
stability, resulting in a downward pressure on future inflation. Second, the lower actual
inflation may have bolstered central banks’ credibility, and so amplifying the inflation
dampening effect of the original positive supply shock. Third, understanding globalisation
as downward pressure on prices and wages, economic agents will take these movements
into account and lower their expectations even further. This results in a flattening of the
Phillips curve, and an increased incentive for the central bank to keep the monetary
discipline and anchor the expectations of the economic agents even further (Gnan and
Valderrama, 2006).
A recent theoretical study by Cavelars (2009) shows that these inter-temporal assumptions
are flawed. First, the argument that increased openness enhances monetary discipline put
forward by Romer (1993) is not fully robust since a lowering of import tariffs can make it
more attractive to conduct expansionary monetary policy (to boost expenditure). Second,
an increase in competition in the goods market may have an adverse effect on monetary
policy. Cavelars shows that a decline in monopoly power of firms enhances the
expenditure-switching effect of monetary policy; the latter result standing in contrast with
Rogoff (2003, 2006). In other words, when competition is fierce, a change in the
international relative price of goods gives rise to larger shifts in demand, prompting central
banks to respond to these demand shifts (even if they don’t have price effects). Hence,
globalisation is not assurance for monetary discipline, or lower inflation expectations.
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CONCLUSIONS
The challenges posed to monetary policy by an increasingly interconnected world to have
been highly ranked on policy makers’ agenda for some time. Yet, the evidence that
globalization may alter monetary policy transmission is not always conclusive. Recent
experiences have allured some to conclude that external factors such as commodity price
movements, capital flows and international growth prospects are increasingly influencing
domestic inflation. The discussion proposed in this paper is whether this has resulted in a
weaker influence of national central banks on domestic inflation (i.e. a credibility issue),
and whether the monetary discipline has directly increased as a result of the globalisation.
The answer is negative. As Mishkin (2009) points out, the exaggerated claim that greater
openness of economies invalidates traditional economic models of inflation, and thus
monetary policy’s ability to stabilise it is not true. Globalisation does have the potential to
be stabilising for individual economies and has been a key factor in promoting growth.
However, globalisation has not led to a decline in the sensitivity of inflation to domestic
output gap nor to domestic monetary policy. Domestic monetary policy can still control
domestic interest rates and so stabilise inflation (and output). The only way in which
globalisation might matter is by challenging central banks in keeping inflation expectations
fully anchored nationally, and by increasing coordination of financial measures globally. The
latter is particularly relevant given the presence of banks operating worldwide, hence
increasing the likelihood of cross-border propagation of domestic liquidity shocks.
This does, however, not mean that the degree of openness of an economy is no significance
for the conduct of monetary policy directly (Woodford, 2010). Monetary policies should
indeed be increasing mutual sensitivity of the monetary transmission channel to changes in
the exchange rate. Moreover, openness forces central banks to confront a variety of
practical issues that would not be present in the case of a closed economy, such as whether
to stabilize an index of domestic prices only, or an index of the prices of all goods
consumed in the domestic economy (hence, calling upon a proper measurement of
domestic inflation vs. import prices). Also, the need of correct quantitative specification of
the structural models used in a central bank more has become more urgent. Overall,
however, globalisation, even if expected to be rapid, does not justify the degree of alarm
that some commentators have urged upon central banks. No matter the pace of
globalisation and how great its eventual extent may be, it should remain possible for a
disciplined central bank towards a clear inflation target to achieve that goal without any
exceptional needs for coordination of monetary policy with other central banks, as the
initial stage of the crisis has shown. The need for coordinated and detailed action lies
instead in the financial (policy) sphere.
Is globalization reducing the ability of central banks to control inflation?
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